Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 46
Issue 3 Issue 3 - April 1993

Article 6

4-1993

Buying Fertility: The Constitutionality of Welfare Bonuses for
Welfare Mothers Who Submit to Norplant Insertion
John R. Hand

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
John R. Hand, Buying Fertility: The Constitutionality of Welfare Bonuses for Welfare Mothers Who Submit
to Norplant Insertion, 46 Vanderbilt Law Review 715 (1993)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol46/iss3/6

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Buying Fertility: The Constitutionality of
Welfare Bonuses for Welfare Mothers Who
Submit to Norplant Insertion
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ......................................
TIONAL ARGUMENT

A.
B.
C.
D.
III.

AGAINST THEM ....................

The Proposed Statutes .........................
The Ideal Argument-Finding an Interference
With Liberty ..................................
The Right to ProcreateIs Fundamental .........
The Level of Scrutiny and the Governmental Interest .........................................

THE CAVEATS OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS .......

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
IV.

715

THE PROPOSED NORPLANT STATUTES AND THE CONSTITU-

A Doctrine of Inconsistency ....................
The Court's Malleable Rhetoric .................
Some Proposals ...............................
So Where Does the Instant Case Fall?: A Practical
Approach .....................................
How Well Does This Pragmatic Approach Explain
the Close Cases ...............................

717

717
718
721
722
723
724
727
733
736
741

THE RIGHT, ITS FUNDAMENTAL NATURE, AND THE LEVEL OF

SCRUTINY ..........................................

A.
B.

Background ...................................
The Compelling Interest and Rational Basis Tests
V . SOLUTIONS .........................................
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................
I.

744
744
749
750
752

INTRODUCTION

In 1990, Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories introduced Norplant, a fiveyear contraceptive consisting of six capsules that release contraceptive
hormones when inserted in a woman's arm.1 Soon after the introduction
of Norplant, a Philadelphia Inquirer editorial column stirred tremendous controversy when the author suggested that Norplant could solve
the welfare problem if states would offer welfare mothers incentives to
1.

Physicians' Desk Reference, 2598-2601 (Medical Economics Data, 47th ed. 1993).
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use the device.' Tremendous outrage and cries of racism, fascism and
genocide prompted the Inquirer's Editor, Maxwell King, to apologize
publicly and retract the editorial.'
Despite the fury, some states have introduced welfare reform bills
that would do exactly what the Inquirer editorial so boldly suggested.'
In a nutshell, the typical law would offer female welfare recipients a
cash incentive of $500 if they allow the state to insert Norplant at its
own expense. If passed, such a law would not only generate a wave of
criticism but also would present a most perplexing constitutional antimony. Essentially, a law offering cash for Norplant insertion would
bring two unresolved and arguably unsolvable constitutional doctrines-the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and the doctrine of
certain "privacy rights" as fundamental constitutional rights-to bear
on the same issue.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine states that the government cannot bribe people with benefits and privileges to forego rights
with which the government could not interfere directly. For example,
the government could not pay people $100 a week not to go to church
or pay them to worship one religion but not another.5 The counterargument, based on the premise that the government has no duty to give
benefits, suggests that the right not to give a benefit includes the lesser
right to offer it conditionally.6 In addition to this inquiry, the next challenge is to define the right with which the government is interfering and
to determine whether that right is fundamental. Since the right to procreate is not specifically listed in the Constitution, the issue is whether
it is included in the bundle of "privacy" rights enunciated in cases such
as Roe v. Wade.7 Finally, one must determine the level of scrutiny the
Court would apply to a constitutional analysis of the Norplant statutes.
That determination hinges in large part on whether the Court considers
the right to be fundamental.
This Note places moral issues aside and concentrates on the constitutional implications of these welfare statutes. Part II outlines the proposed Norplant legislation and develops an ideal constitutional
argument against such statutes. Part III analyzes the current state of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and demonstrates the difficulty
2. Poverty and NORPLANT: Can ContraceptionReduce the Underclass?,Philadelphia Inquirer A18 (Dec. 12, 1990).
3. An Apology, the Editorial on Norplant and Poverty was Misguided and Wrongheaded,
Philadelphia Inquirer C4 (Dec. 23, 1990).
4. See notes 8-15.
5. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
6. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to obtain an abortion is fundamental and any
restriction on the right deserves strict scrutiny).
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in predicting where a hypothetical Norplant case would fall in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions. Part IV defines the spectrum of privacy rights and determines which right is implicated by the proposed
Norplant statute and which standard of scrutiny should apply. Part V
offers some solutions to the current confusion in the unconstitutional
conditions context. This Note concludes by predicting how the Court
would respond if a Norplant law were passed and challenged and recommends changes in the proposed Norplant statutes so as to avoid a
constitutional confrontation altogether.
II. THE PROPOSED NORPLANT STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENT AGAINST THEM

A.

The Proposed Statutes

Since the introduction of Norplant, several states have proposed,
introduced, or passed legislation that incorporates Norplant into welfare reform." These laws vary in their level of intrusiveness upon civil
liberties. For example, Union County, North Carolina started a pilot
program where the county provides Norplant to welfare mothers who
want it. Similarly, California has passed a law that will provide information and Norplant insertion for AFDC mothers who desire it. 10
While these two laws apparently raise no constitutional concerns,"
other state proposals are raising eyebrows. For example, Kansas has introduced a bill that would offer a $500 welfare bonus to mothers who
receive Aid For Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") if they
agree to Norplant insertion. 12 Tennessee originally introduced an identical bill that was later amended to offer $500 "scholarships" to welfare
women who choose Norplant and welfare men who agree to vasectomies.'3 David Duke drafted similar legislation in Louisiana that would
have offered an extra $100 a month for Norplant recipients, but the
8. See notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
9. Gene Stowe, Mother, 20, First For Union's Norplant Program, Charlotte Observer 2B
(July 13, 1991).
10. flana DeBare, Poor Waiting For Norplant Aid Delayed While State, Maker Fight Over.
Cost, Sacramento Bee A3 (Oct. 17, 1991).
11. These laws presumably pass muster because no cash or other incentive exists to encourage women to participate; therefore, no interference with a liberty is present. For a more thorough discusion of what constitutes an interference with liberty, see generally Lynn A. Baker, The
Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of UnconstitutionalConditions, 75 Cornell L. Rev.
1185, 1202-05 (1990).
12. 1991 Kansas House Bill No. 2089, 74th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (1992).
13. The bill originally was introduced as 1991 Tennessee Senate Bill No. 2452, 97th General
Assembly and offered cash instead of scholarships. The bill later was amended to change the cash
to scholarships, limiting the use of the money for further education at any level and to give males
the option of vasectomy. Bill Will Give School Funds if Poor Use Birth Control, Detroit Free
Press 3A (Apr. 17, 1992). Although this bill was recently defeated in the state senate, Representa-
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cash incentives were eventually removed, primarily because the measure would have cost an estimated $40 million. 4 Mississippi has introduced a bill that would require Norplant insertion for some welfare
recipients, and Washington state senator Scott Barr is backing a law
offering $10,000 bonuses to welfare mothers who agree to a tubal ligation after their first child is born. 5
Although none of the more coercive bills have passed, this Note
focuses on the type of law considered in Kansas and Tennessee whereby
women are not required to receive Norplant but are offered financial
incentives to do so. This type of law presents the most difficult constitutional analysis but is important because these laws represent the gray
area between a constitutionally permissible law like California's, which
encourages voluntary use of Norplant, and a more intrusive law like
Mississippi's, which requires Norplant insertion in certain situations.
Furthermore, because the proposed Tennessee statute contains politically palatable amendments, it is likely to survive the legislation process
and represents the most evenly matched struggle, constitutionally
speaking, between welfare reform and individual civil rights. This Note
refers to statutes like Tennessee's with the generic term "Norplant statute." To avoid confusion and constant comparison of the differences
between the Tennessee and Kansas statutes, this Note categorizes the
suspect statute as one that offers a $500 cash incentive for welfare
mothers who submit to Norplant insertion.
B.

The Ideal Argument-Finding an Interference With Liberty

If the Norplant statute or a similar version passes, standing requirements would narrow potential challengers primarily to female
AFDC recipients, either individually or as a class.' 6 The first step in
challenging a Norplant law under substantive due process is identifying
an interference with some right or liberty or, alternatively under the
17
Equal Protection Clause, some type of impermissible classification.
Normally, due process interference is obvious if the law is directly prohibitive, but the interference created by the Norplant statute is not so
clear since the statute would neither require nor prohibit any type of
tive Steve McDaniel plans to revive the bill next session. The Norplant Debate, Newsweek 37-38
(Feb. 15, 1993).
14. Maralee Schwartz, Duke Presses Louisiana Birth Control, Wash. Post A14 (May 29,
1991).
15. See 1992 Mississippi Senate Bill 2895 and Jim Simon, Heavy Hand of Welfare Reform
LegislatorsPlanning to Get Tough, Seattle Times B1 (Jan. 31, 1992).
16. See, for example, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (holding that standing
requires that one challenging a law must have some "injury in fact" and "cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties").
17. See Baker, 75 Cornell L. Rev. at 1202-05 (cited in note 11).
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activity. Therefore, the challenging party would have to base her interference argument on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the challengers
would argue that the state cannot use benefits and privileges to encourage the surrender of constitutional rights which the state could not
seize directly. 18 For instance, in Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 9 the United States Supreme Court struck down a California
law that conditioned highway privileges on submission to common carrier status, a submission that California concededly could not have required directly. 20 In so doing, the Court held that it would be illogical to
allow a state to buy rights using valuable privileges as an incentive
when the Constitution would2 prohibit that same state from any direct
interference with that right. 1
The Supreme Court rephrased this doctrine in Sherbert v. Verner.2 2 In Sherbert, the Court ruled that denying unemployment compensation to a Seventh-Day Adventist applicant who refused to work on
her Sabbath Day was unconstitutional. " The Court recognized that the
applicant was forced into a choice between following her religion and
foregoing benefits 24 and likened the denial to a fine or penalty for going
to church. 5
Along these same lines, welfare mothers initially could argue that a
state could not directly require indigent women to have Norplant inserted since this would constitute a blatant interference with an arguably fundamental right.26 Then, these mothers could import the rule set
forth in Sherbert and argue that conditioning the $500 bonus on the
18. See, for example, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that South Carolina could not deny unemployment benefits because applicant, a Seventh-Day Adventist, refused
to work on her Sabbath Day); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (holding that California
could not condition a veteran's tax exemption on the stipulation that he pledge loyalty to the
government).
19. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
20. Id. at 592.
21. The Court stated:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by
words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise
of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold.
Id. at 593.
22. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
23. Id. at 410.
24. Id. at 404.
25. Id.
26. In the unlikely event that a state would refute this assumption, the plaintiffs could rely
on Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), which stands for the proposition that the state
cannot forcibly deny the right to procreate.
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forbearance of their right to procreate would, in essence, act as a fine
for exercising or holding onto this right. In other words, if most welfare
women chose the $500, then the minority of women that did not would
be penalized $500 as compared to the status quo. In fact, the Norplant
statute lends itself quite readily to an analysis under the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions-even more so than did the statute in
Sherbert. In Sherbert, the condition or choice was created by happenstance and was not the original intent of the unemployment law. The
state did not set out to deprive those who chose Saturday worship of
their right to observe their Sabbath. Contrarily, a Norplant statute
would be a direct attempt to coerce welfare women to forbear their
right to procreate. Therefore, a Norplant case arguably would be more
deserving of an analysis under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
than was the statute in Sherbert. The Norplant statute embodies the
classic unconstitutional condition situation in its purest form and, as
such, unconstitutionally interferes with the right to have children.28
Challengers of the statute also could employ an equal protection
analysis and assert that the statute facially and invidiously discriminates against women by subjecting them to a coercive choice to which
men are not subjected. Furthermore, as a gender classification the law
deserves a heightened scrutiny.29 Alternatively, they could argue for
strict scrutiny since the classification arguably involves a fundamental
30
right.
A potential equal protection challenge raises a question regarding
which gender would bring an action. Women would bring the argument
outlined above. Interestingly, however, indigent men also could attack
the law by arguing that it unfairly gives indigent women an opportunity
that men do not have to increase their benefits by $500. This twist
reveals the paradox of unconstitutional conditions in the context of
equal protection. Deciding which gender the state is treating unfairly
depends on whether one views a conditioned benefit as an opportunity
or a threat.
While this dichotomy is interesting, an equal protection argument
is not the strongest plan of attack. First, a facial gender classification, if
proven, only provides for, at most, an intermediate level of scrutiny.3 1
27.

See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-401. The unemployment law was designed to deny benefits

to all those who refused to work without good cause. An intent to discriminate against religion is
not apparent from the statute. In any event, the Court stated that if the law's purpose or effect
was to burden religion, it deserved strict scrutiny. Id. at 399-401.
28. For a complete discussion of this right, see Part IV.
29. See, for example, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
30. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). This argument also would depend on the
classification of the right to procreate as fundamental, as discussed in Part InI.
31. See, for example, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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Second, an equal protection argument adds nothing that a pure substantive due process argument cannot offer. The argument that an impermissible and inequitable interference with a fundamental right
exists is necessarily nested within the unconstitutional conditions
framework and fundamental right analysis already required under a
substantive due process claim. Finally, a state could circumvent an
equal protection attack by including a similar provision for indigent
males as Tennessee has done with its proposed bill. For these reasons,
the better reasoned argument, and that with the greater chance for success, relies not on equal protection theory but on substantive due
process.
C. The Right to Procreate Is Fundamental
If a potential plaintiff convinces the Court that the law does interfere with a right by creating an unconstitutional condition, she then
must convince the Court that the right in question is fundamental and
deserves strict scrutiny.32 First, she must decide how broadly or how
narrowly to phrase the right in question. For example, she could argue
that the law interferes with her general right to privacy or more specifically with her right to procreate or to use contraception.33 The ideal
argument probably would assert one of the latter claims.
A potential plaintiff could rely on Meyer v. Nebraska3 4 for support
of the proposition that the right to procreate is fundamental. Meyer
stated that the right to start a family and raise children is clearly protected by the liberty element of the Due Process Clause.3 5 More on
point is the seminal case of Skinner v. Oklahoma."6 In Skinner, a criminal law that provided for sterilization of some recidivists but not others
was found unconstitutional.3 7 The Court applied the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause and held that the classification of
criminals deserved strict scrutiny because it involved the fundamental
right to procreate.38
32. While the stages of the argument have been separated here for clarity, the two steps of
the unconstitutional conditions argument are interdependent. The Court has never applied the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to strike down a law that only interfered with a nonfundamental or garden variety right.
33. The significance of this choice is discussed further in Part III.
34. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
35. Id. at 399-400. In holding a law unconstitutional that forbade the teaching of foreign
languages, the Court declared that the rights "to marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . [are] essential . . . [and] this liberty may not be interfered with." (emphasis added).

36. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
37. Id. at 543.
38. Id at 541 (stating that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race").
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The Supreme Court confirmed and expanded this right in Carey v.
Population Services International.9 In Carey, the Court overturned a
ban on the sale of contraceptives to minors by nonpharmacists. In so
doing, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, applied a strong compelling interest test because "whether or not to beget or bear a child is at
40
the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices.
Carey is strong evidence that the Court considers the right to procreate
to be on its list of unlisted fundamental rights.
A potential plaintiff could argue that the Norplant case mirrors
Griswold v. Connecticut.4 In Griswold, the Court overruled a ban on
the distribution of contraceptives because the right to choose whether
to have a child is fundamental. The instant case involves the converse
of a ban on birth control in that the Norplant law would, in essence,
force one to use birth control. Intuitively, the right to use birth control
necessarily includes the right not to use birth control. Therefore, a Norplant case deserves the same strict scrutiny that the Court applied in
Griswold and Carey. In other words, the choice whether to use birth
control-not merely access to birth control-is the protected liberty involved in these cases. Consequently, state governments cannot interfere
with either side of that choice either by banning or by requiring birth
control.
D. The Level of Scrutiny and the Governmental Interest
The above line of reasoning provides strong support for the proposition that the right to choose birth control or to procreate is fundamental under the Constitution. If the Supreme Court agrees, then a
Norplant case would deserve the same strict scrutiny the Court applied
in Griswold. Arguably, this scrutiny should be the same strict scrutiny
or compelling interest test that the Court applies when any fundamental right is implicated. This strict scrutiny test requires first that the
law in question promote a compelling governmental interest, and second, the test requires that no less intrusive alternatives be available to
serve the same purpose. 2
Since the government has the burden of proving that the statute
meets the test, the state probably would argue that it has a compelling
economic interest in welfare reform and in reducing the welfare bill.
The government then would assert that the Norplant law would serve
to reduce the number of dependent children and ultimately the welfare
39.
40.
41.
42.

431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Id. at 685.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See, for example, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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bill as a whole. In response, the plaintiff could argue that no empirical
evidence that the law would be economically productive exists. Perhaps
the state would spend large amounts of money providing relatively expensive birth control to women who would have used their original benefits to achieve the same end. Even if the government could show that
using Norplant provides an economic advantage, this interest is not
paramount to individual liberty. Whenever a purely economic interest
collides with a fundamental liberty central to the essence of life in a
democratic society, the economic interest must yield.4 3
Additionally, the government would argue that the Norplant law is
the least intrusive alternative. However, plenty of less intrusive ways to
lower welfare costs exist. For example, removing the cash incentive
would give indigent women the option to use Norplant without the impermissible pressure on the right to procreate. Even better, this option
would save $500 more for every participant. Another alternative would
be to cap benefits regardless of family size. In other words, the state
could set an absolute level of welfare per household and mothers who
choose to have more children would have to make ends meet with the
same amount of income. The Court approved such a reform in Dandridge v. Williams, 4 which held that ceilings on welfare payments do
not interfere with the right to have children. For these reasons, a Norplant law should fail the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny
test.
In sum, a potential challenger to the Norplant law would first assert an interference with her right to procreate because the law unconstitutionally conditions a welfare bonus on forbearance of the right to
bear children. Next, the right to bear children is considered fundamental under the analysis in Griswold and demands strict scrutiny. Under
the strict scrutiny test, the government clearly cannot meet the twotiered burden. For these reasons, the Norplant statute should be overturned because it would violate the substantive Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
III.

THE CAVEATS OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL

CONDITIONS

While the above constitutional argument seems air-tight, many
countervailing considerations exist. The crux of the counter argument
lies in Oliver Wendell Holmes's statement that the right not to offer a
43. See, for example, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (holding that fiscal
considerations did not serve a compelling interest worthy of burdening the fundamental right to
interstate travel).
44. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Whether a ceiling is a commendable approach does not alter the fact
that it is a less intrusive alternative.
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benefit includes the lesser right to offer the benefit conditionally. 45 In
fact, some legal commentators question
whether the unconstitutional
46
conditions doctrine still exists at all.

A.

A Doctrine of Inconsistency

The unconstitutional conditions doctrine first emerged at the turn
of the century when states tried to condition privileges such as the right
to use highways on acceptance of common carrier liability.47 Since then,

the doctrine has narrowly, but nonetheless, survived. 48 A consistent application of the doctrine would hold any law unconstitutional that conditioned government benefits on forbearance of or intrusion on a
constitutional right. However, unconstitutional conditions cases arise in
a variety of contexts, and apparently similar cases have been decided
differently.
In the free speech context, for example, the Supreme Court has
used the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in cases such as Perry v.
Sindermann49 and Speiser v. Randall.50 In Speiser, the Court struck
down a California tax law that required veterans to sign a pledge of
loyalty to the United States government and the State of California
before they could receive a tax exemption. The Court found that this
tax law unconstitutionally conditioned the exemption on forbearance of
the fundamental right to free speech.5 1 Conversely, in American Communications v. Douds,52 the Court upheld a nearly identical loyalty
pledge that required union leaders to denounce Communist ties and
promise loyalty to the United States government in order to get National Labor Relations Board privileges. 3
45. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes dissenting) (arguing that
the government has no duty to offer someone a government position; therefore, it can justifiably
offer the position conditionally).
46. See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine?,
26 San Diego L. Rev. 337 (1989).
47. See, for example, Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) and Terral
v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (holding a law that conditioned the right to do
business on forbearance of a right to invoke diversity jurisdiction in federal court
unconstitutional).
48. Recent examples include Arkansas Writer's Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221. (1987)
(holding that an Arkansas tax exemption to publishers based upon the subject matter of the written material is unconstitutional) and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
(holding that a building permit conditioned upon a landowner's donation of a public beachfront
easement was an unconstituional subversion of the takings clause).
49. 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (in which an untenured professor successfully challenged a decision
not to extend his contract which was based on his exercise of the right to free speech).
50. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
51. Id. at 528-29.
52. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
53. Id. at 415.
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In two more recent cases, the Court applied the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. In FCC v. League of Women Voters,5 the Court
struck down a law that prohibited publicly assisted broadcasters from
using public funds for editorializing. In another case, however, the
Court upheld an IRS restriction conditioning tax exemption status on
whether a nonprofit organization engages in substantial lobbying.5 5
Both laws involved a government benefit conditioned on some forbearance of free speech, but one was constitutional and the other was not.
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court overturned a South Carolina unemployment benefit scheme that denied payments to appellant because
she would not work on her Sabbath Day.5 6 The Court found that this
law unfairly conditioned the benefit of unemployment payments on the
forbearance of the free exercise of religion. However, the Court later
upheld a similar law in Bowen v. Roy.57 In Bowen, the Pennsylvania
welfare program denied benefits to a Native American family who refused to provide a social security number for their two year old daughter. The family's religious beliefs dictated that an identifying social
security number would interfere with the child's unique spiritual development. For this reason, they were denied welfare.5 8 In both cases, receipt of benefits was conditioned on the sacrifice of religious principles,
but one passed muster and the other did not.
The Court followed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in one
right to marry case and struck down a Wisconsin law that required fathers with non-custodial children to prove that support payments were
up to date before they could get remarried.5 9 The Court found that this
condition interfered with the fundamental right to marriage since it discouraged or even prevented indigent fathers from getting married.6 0
Yet, the Court refused to employ the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Califano v. Jobst6 1 In Califano, the Court upheld a Social Security regulation that terminated benefits to disabled dependent
children if they chose to get married, even if the spouse was disabled
but not receiving Social Security. The law in Califano did allow the
continuation of benefits if the new spouse also was receiving Social Se54. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
55. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
56. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court recently affirmed this ruling in the similar case of Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
57. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
58. Id. at 696.
59. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
60. Id.
61. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
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curity 2 While both laws financially burdened the choice of whether to
marry, one was constitutional and the other was not.
The last significant area of unconstitutional conditions cases involves privacy rights. The Court has applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and found that forced maternity leave without pay
unconstitutionally interferes with the choice to get pregnant. 3 Also, a
circuit court has held that states cannot condition employment on forgoing the private right to breast-feed.6 4 On the other hand, the Supreme Court also has held that the state can offer a disability insurance
plan covering all disabilities except those incident to childbirth. 65 Furthermore, the Court has ruled that the government can fund childbirth,
but not abortion, without any unconstitutional interference with an indigent woman's fundamental right to choose between abortion and having the child, even if the law puts the abortion option financially out of
reach. 6 In fact, the state's ability not to fund abortion extends to most
medically necessary abortions as well.6 These cases clearly allow the
government to bribe the indigent pregnant female to choose birth over
abortion, a result that flies in the face of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Perhaps the most intrusive example of this tendency is the recent
case of Rust v. Sullivan which involves the federal abortion "gag
rule." In a five to four decision, the Court upheld a Department of
Health and Human Services. regulation that forbade Title X projects
from counseling, suggesting, or in any way recognizing or advocating
abortion as a viable option for pregnant women.6 9 In other words, it is
constitutionally permissible for the government to condition the receipt
of federal funds on a public clinic's forbearance of its right to counsel
abortion as a method of family planning. While this holding directly
implicates First Amendment speech, including the doctor-patient relationship, it also indirectly affects an indigent woman's right to an abortion. If indigent women rely on these public clinics for prenatal advice,
they will not be fully informed of their abortion rights. The net effect is
that fewer women will have abortion as a viable alternative to preg62. Id. at 51.
63. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,414 U.S. 632 (1974) and Turner v. Dept. of Emp.
Sec. of Utah, 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
64. Dike v. -School Bd. of Orange County, 650 F.2d 783 (1981).
65. Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Congress overturned Gedulig by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
66. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding a Connecticut welfare statute that funded
childbirth and first trimester abortions which a doctor deemed medically necessary).
67. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
68. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
69. Id. at 1764-65.
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nancy. The government has interfered with the fundamental right to
choose abortion7 0 by eliminating a primary, if not the only, source of
information regarding abortion that is available to indigent women.
Rust v. Sullivan is significant because it involves both abortion and
First Amendment free speech issues. Therefore, Sullivan is difficult to
reconcile with other First Amendment cases such as Speiser and
League of Women Voters.
All of these examples illustrate how inconsistently the Court has
applied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. From these conflicting cases, two questions naturally arise: 1) how can the Court reconcile
these cases? and, the threshold question 2) how can one predict when
the Court will invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and
when it will not?
B.

The Court's Malleable Rhetoric

In each of these contradictory cases, the Supreme Court heard arguments stemming from the previous countervailing decision. For example, the Native American plaintiffs in Bowen v. Roy made the same
arguments that previously had persuaded the Court in Sherbert v. Verner. In ruling for the defendants in each of these cases, the Court was
forced to reconcile its holding with that of a previous opposite decision.
The Court's explanations in these cases are worth mentioning because
they shed some light into the Court's reasoning (or lack thereof) and
they help clarify why the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is so
unsettled.
In the context of the First Amendment, the Court broadly held in
Perry v. Sindermann that, although no one has a right to a government
benefit and the government may deny a benefit for a number of reasons, a benefit may not be denied on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected speech.71 In Perry, the Court ordered a university to
reinstate a professor's employment contract which previously had not
been renewed because he spoke out against the state university. The
Court subsequently introduced a new restrictive variable in Douds,
where it determined that the law requiring union leaders to pledge loyalty was not "aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas '" 2 and ap3 Therefore, the
parently deserved only a rational basis test.7
Court
7
4
upheld the law. The Speiser Court then used the exact same language
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
Douds, 339 U.S. at 402.
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 415.
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to strike down a similar California condition that required veterans to
pledge loyalty when seeking a tax exemption. The Court found that
"the denial [of the tax exemption] is frankly aimed at the suppression
of dangerous ideas. 7' 5 Then the Court went on to apply traditional unconstitutional conditions language by likening the law to a fine that coerced the claimants to refrain from free speech.7 6 Although the Court
relied on the judicially created "aimed at suppression of dangerous
ideas" distinction in deciding Speiser and Douds, the ideas conditionally suppressed in each case appear identical. In each case, the dangerous ideas being suppressed were hostile feelings or beliefs towards the
United States government. Therefore, it is difficult to discern how one
set of ideas was more dangerous than the other.
The Supreme Court continued to apply the "dangerous ideas" test
77
in the lobbying case of Regan v. Taxation With Representation.
The
Court found no interference with liberty in this case, but in dicta recognized that "[t]he case would be different if [Congress had intended]
'the suppression of dangerous ideas.' "781 Therefore, the Court created a
new variable in First Amendment cases, at least in those involving unconstitutional conditions: the law must aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas to be considered an interference with liberty. Since an
interference must be present in order for the Court to continue the constitutional analysis, those statutes that the Court considers not to be
aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas are, under the Court's new
test, necessarily constitutional. As Taxation With Representation,
Speiser, and Douds indicate, the relativity of what is a "dangerous
idea" and what exactly constitutes an "aim to suppress" reserves to the
Court considerable discretion in deciding unconstitutional condition
79
cases.

The Taxation With Representation Court also introduced another
line of confusing rhetoric. At the start of its analysis, the Court stated
that the government had not infringed on any First Amendment right
simply because it had chosen not to "subsidize" Taxation With Representation's First Amendment right to lobby.80 Therefore, the Court
found no interference with liberty. Interestingly, this language echoes
the Holmesian statement that the right not to offer a benefit includes
the lesser right to offer it conditionally. 1 In other words, the govern75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519.
Id. at 518.
461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983).
Id. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959)).
This is exactly the type of malleable rhetoric refered to previously.
Taxation With Representation,461 U.S. at 546.
See, for example, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926).
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ment can give nonprofit organizations tax exempt status provided they
forgo their right to lobby because the government does not have to give
tax exemptions in the first place. The same argument could just as easily apply in League of Women Voters because the State of California
simply chose not to subsidize editorializing; however, the Court rejected
this very argument. 2 Instead, the Court seemed to differentiate the
cases on the facts. The Court pointed out that Taxation With Representation, Inc. could more easily separate its lobbying activities from its
general nonprofit work than radio stations could separate funds used
for editorializing and those used for general radio programming. Incidentally, the Court failed to analyze whether California was intending
to suppress dangerous ideas."3
Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court revived classic unconstitutional conditions language and determined that to condition benefits
84
on forbearance of religious activity "penalizes" the exercise of religion.
The Court then applied a compelling interest test to find the benefit
program unconstitutional. 5 The Native American plaintiffs in Bowen v.
Roy also were forced to choose between Social Security benefits and a
firm religious conviction, but the Roy Court refused to apply the rule in
Verner and found no penalty burdening religious views.8 6 In fact, the'
Court hinted at a Holmesian approach when it called attention to the
fact that appellees were not being persecuted but were only seeking a
benefit. The Roy Court concluded that the standard for government
conduct is less for conditioned benefits than for direct prohibitions of
religious activity. 7 In other words, the Roy Court treats conditions on
benefits more deferentially than it does direct interferences with First
Amendment liberties. Consequently, the Roy Court applied a rational
basis test and upheld the law. 8
The Court did make a jaded effort to distinguish Sherbert based on
the language of the statutes in question. The South Carolina statute in
Sherbert stated that those who "without good cause" declined work
would not be eligible for unemployment, 89 while the Social Security law
in Roy demanded that all who apply must provide a Social Security
82. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-401.
83. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364.
84. Conditioning "the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a
cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional
liberties." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
85. Id.
86. 476 U.S. at 703.
87. Id. at 703-07.
88. Id. at 710.
89. 374 U.S. at 400 n.3.
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number.9 0 The Court suggested that the "without good cause" phrase in
Sherbert allowed the Court to consider exceptions or to review what is
"good cause," but that the absolute nature of the Social Security law
left no such room for interpretation. 9 ' Furthermore, the fact that the
state in Sherbert had the option to decide what was good cause and had
determined that religion was not, suggested a hostile attitude towards
religion. 2 But if the distinction between the wording of the two statutes
was truly controlling, then the original Sherbert decision should have
reflected the importance of wording. In Sherbert, the Court could have
stated that the statute left room to interpret what constitutes "good
cause" and that the state wrongly decided what was "good cause."
Then, Sherbert truly would be limited to its specific facts. However,
under the "penalty" explanation offered in Sherbert, the South Carolina unemployment law would create the same penalty whether it was
absolute or discretionary. In other words, even if the statute read "no
one who declines work" instead of "no one who declines work without
good cause," the choice, and therefore the penalty, is the same for the
plaintiff in Sherbert. By using an interpretation of statutory language,
the Court effectively skirted the issue of why the option given the Sherbert plaintiff created a penalty, whereas the option facing the Roy
plaintiff did not. The interesting point is that the Court found a "penalty" on religion in Sherbert but did not in Roy. This "penalty" language again provided the Court substantial discretion in deciding these
unconstitutional conditions cases. From these two cases, it appears difficult for any scholar or practitioner, save the Justices of the Court themselves, to determine what constitutes a penalty and what does not.
The Court chose a different phraseology with regard to the right to
marry cases to decide whether a benefit scheme interfered with the
right to marry. In Califano v. Jobst, where the plaintiff lost Social Security benefits if he married another disabled person who was not receiving benefits, the Court applied a rational basis test to uphold the
law regardless of whether some people were deterred from marriage or
burdened by the law if they did marry.93 The Court never admitted
that the right to marriage was fundamental.9 4 Conversely, in Zablocki,
the Court spent the first three pages arguing how fundamental the institution of marriage really is. Then it applied "critical examination"
scrutiny to strike down the Wisconsin law that required deadbeat fa90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

476 U.S. at 708.
Id.
Id.
Jobst, 434 U.S. at 53-54.
See id.
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thers to pay past due child support before they could remarry.95 The
Court then distinguished Zablocki from Jobst by averring that the critical difference was the "directness and the substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry."9 The Court felt that the Wisconsin
law in Zablocki could serve to prohibit some of the poorest fathers from
marrying, while the Jobst law just would have made marrying financially ill-advised. In reality, the amount lost by losing otherwise lifetime
benefits could easily surpass the amount of debt owed by certain fathers. Whether the distinction is meritorious is incidental to the fact
that the Court has inserted yet another malleable phrase, "direct and
substantial interference," that provides leeway for future Court determinations, thereby inserting uncertainty in future similar cases.
The Court relied on similar phrases in deciding the female privacy
rights cases as well. In Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur97 where
unpaid maternity was required, the Court, using the compelling interest
test, overruled the statute because it placed a "heavy burden" on the
private right to bear children or remain employed.9 8 Stated in terms of
a condition, the statute conditioned the benefit, continuous employment, on not becoming pregnant. The Fifth Circuit used similar language in striking down the "undue interference" of regulating breast
feeding in the Dike case.9 9 In Maher v. Roe, the Supreme Court found
no "undue burden" on a fundamental right when states chose to fund
childbirth but not abortion.10 0 Therefore, no fundamental right was
"impinged" upon and only the rational basis test was required. 01 Interestingly, statutes such as the one in Maher can serve to eliminate completely the abortion option for indigent women, thereby financially
forcing them to choose birth. The forced maternity leave cases, on the
other hand, do not effectively bar childbirth; they merely make it economically taxing. This point indicates how tenuous and discretionary
such phrases as "undue interference" can be.
The Maher Court also returned to the non-subsidy rhetoric used in
Taxation With Representation.The Court employed another version of
the Holmesian argument that the conditioned benefit does not create
any obstacle that was not already there. 02 Additionally, the state can
95. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383.
96. Id. at 387 n.12.
97. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
98. Id. at 640.
99. Dike v. School Bd. of Orange County, 650 F.2d 783, 785 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that
"It]he Constitution protects from undue state interference with citizens' freedom of personal
choice in some areas of marriage and family life").
100. 432 U.S. 464, 473-75 (1977).
101. Id. at 474, 478.
102. Id. at 474.
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offer benefits in ways that encourage socially desirable behavior. The
Court extended this argument even to statutes in which the state refuses to fund certain medically necessary abortions.10 s In Harris v. McRae, the Court reasoned that the courts cannot create obstacles 1to
04
abortion but have no duty to remove obstacles that it did not create.
In fact, the indigent woman is in no worse position than if the state did
not fund any obstetric expenses. The government does not have to subsidize rights. According to this argument, the government could offer
welfare only to Republicans or Catholics since the others are no worse
off than if the government offered no benefit and since the government
has no duty to subsidize rights. Intuitively, if this is the rule, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine no longer exists.
Rust v. Sullivan employed nearly all of the new ambiguous catch
phrases in addressing the "gag rule." It first extended the non-subsidy
argument and rejected the "penalty" argument in cases involving
speech as well as abortion.10 5 The Court then refused to find any sup-

pression of a "dangerous idea."106 The Court even found no "discrimination on the basis of viewpoint.

' 10 7

Furthermore, the Court found that

the law does not "impermissibly burden" ar indigent woman's right to
an abortion.108
The Court made a groping effort to preserve its prior unconstitutional conditions cases by distinguishing Sullivan. The Court stated
that the "gag rule" only places a condition on a program, and not on
any recipient, and that outside the program employees are free to advise patients of anything they wish.109 This language ties in with the
Taxation With Representation separation argument-that the law is
permissible because employees can exercise their freedom to speak
about abortion elsewhere. This argument essentially says that the government can take away a fundamental right in certain situations so long
as the person can find another outlet for expression of that right.
Therefore, the state could theoretically pass a law that says all employees in state funded program X must believe in God or pray while at
103. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
104. Id. at 314-16.
105. 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991).
106. Id. at 1772-73.
107. Id. at 1773. This was another catch phrase used in Arkansas Writer's Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987). This Note did not previously develop a discussion of this phrase
because it lacked an inapposite case for comparison. Ragland held that a tax on special interest
magazines, but not newspapers, was an unconstitutionally conditioned tax based on what a publisher chose to print.
108. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. at 1777.
109. Id. at 1774.

1993]

BUYING FERTILITY

work since they can practice atheism on their own time. 110 Sullivan exemplifies the lack of uniformity among unconstitutional conditions
cases. It demonstrates the way the Court can use its discretionary
threshold terms to uphold laws that create seemingly textbook unconstitutional conditions.
C. Some Proposals
The erratic nature of these decisions has led many legal commentators to study, analyze, and laboriously dissect the unconstitutional conditions cases in search of a workable doctrine or explanation." 1 The
culmination of these efforts reveals just how unexplainable and troublesome the doctrine is.
In an exhaustively thorough and insightful article, Kathleen Sullivan approached the problem of understanding the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine from several angles. 1 2 Her article starts with the
Court's use of a "coercion" framework to indicate when conditions become unconstitutional."' Implicitly, she argues that the Court finds
conditions unconstitutional when they reach the level of coercion. Coercion principles presumably determine whether a condition is a penalty
or a nonsubsidy. " 4 Sullivan concedes that this explanation necessarily
fails mainly because coercion is a relative concept that depends on
where one draws a baseline for comparison." 5
110. The argument given by the Court in Sullivan ties into the related argument that the
government has not paid for abortion counseling, they have paid only for birth counseling. Supporters of this argument believe that this situation is no different from hiring an algebra teacher to
do nothing but teach algebra. While this argument is creative and clever, it ignores the real purpose and effect of the law. The purpose of the law is to prevent women who rely on government
clinics from having abortions. While the method-targeting employees of the clinics-is indirect,
the effect is the same as if the government had directly paid indigent women not to have abortions.
In essence, money was spent, a benefit distributed, and fewer abortions performed, assuming a gag
rule would work to prevent some women from having abortions. Under this reasoning, states could
achieve the same results with a Norplant law that targeted social workers, government clinics, and
any other government employee who dealt with indigent women. Such a law could require all government employees to advise, whenever possible, that Norplant is the greatest breakthrough and
all women should have it inserted. The caveat on this argument is that it ignores the indirect
burden that such advocacy puts on constitutional rights or choices. While there is no professed
fundamental right to learn algebra or any other subject, there is a fundamental right to an abortion that state governments should take into account when allocating resources in ways that advocate one choice but not another.
111. For a complete list of notable works see Lynn A. Baker, The Pricesof Rights: Toward a
Positive Theory Of UnconstitutionalConditions, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1185, 1187 n.6 (1990).
112. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989).
113. Id. at 1428-56.
114. Id. at 1436-39.
115. Id. at 1440-42.
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Next, Sullivan analyzes condition cases from a "corruption" viewpoint.11 6 The corruption theory suggests that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides the Court a tool or check on corrupt
legislative procedure. 1 7 Within this framework, she suggests that germaneness or relatedness of a condition to the legitimate governmental
interest targeted in the statute or policy as a whole controls its constitutionality. In other words, if the condition is unrelated to the aim of
the law then it is suspect and probably unconstitutional. 1 8 She then
casts this theory within three philosophic theories of legislative process:
interest-group pluralism, civic republicanism, and public choice. 119 Although the inquiry was academically stimulating, she once again conceded that germaneness is a relative concept and thus ineffective for
120
accurately explaining unconstitutional conditions.
Sullivan then addressed unconstitutional conditions cases from a
standpoint of "commodification."' 2' This economic-based theory assumes that certain rights are inherently inalienable and that unconstitutional conditions cases serve as a judicial vehicle to prevent alienation
of inalienable rights. Sullivan seeks to justify philosophically an inalienable rights theory by incorporating inalienable arguments within socioeconomic theories of paternalism, John Stuart Mill's efficiency,
distribution and personhood. 2 2 These explanations also fail since they
address private transactions and do not adequately address the issue
2
when government is a party to the transaction. 1
Sullivan does recommend a novel approach to unconstitutional
conditions cases whereby statutes should meet the compelling interest
test anytime a "preferred constitutional liberty" is pressured. 1 24 Sullivan points out that it could still be difficult, or discretionary, for a
Court to determine when a right is "pressured," and she recommends
that when in doubt one should err on the side of overinclusiveness in
the protected category. The point is that while this suggestion would be
an improvement from the current state of affairs, no workable guideline
to explain the present cases or, more importantly, to predict the outcome of future cases exists.
116. Id. at 1456-76.
117. Id. at 1456.
118. Id. at 1457.
119. Id. at 1468-73.
120. Id. at 1474.
121. Id. at 1476-89.
122. Id. at 1479-86. The technical inquiries of Sullivan's article are provided here to emphasize the depth of research and thought that have been spent explaining why unconstitutional conditions cases are unexplainable.
123. Id. at 1489.
124. Id. at 1499-1505.
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Kenneth Simons also attempts to explain when conditions should
pass muster and when they should not.12 5 His article claims that the

cases should turn on whether the condition is an "offer" or a
"threat."12 He further adds a germaneness factor when he distinguishes
between "pure threats" and "impure threats.

12 7

He defines an offer as

when the government condition would improve one's status quo and a
threat as when the condition would decrease one's status quo.1 28 In

other words, a tax break conditioned on a right is less problematic than
a tax increase conditioned on a right. The problem with his analysis is
that he bases his analysis on a speculation as to what the government
would do if the condition were declared void. This reasoning is inherently problematic, as he readily admits. 12 Another problem is that he
disagrees with the fundamental unconstitutional conditions presumption that a benefit or bonus withheld is equivalent to a fine of the same
amount even if people do not always perceive it that way. 30 Whether
the government offers a "threat" of $200 or an "offer" of $200, the right
holder is still out $200 at the end of the day relative to those who give
up their right. Simons eventually concedes that his explanation is
not necessarily determinative of constitutionality. Sometimes both the threat and
the corresponding offer are constitutional; sometimes neither are; sometimes, indeed, the threat is constitutional but the corresponding offer is not. The threat/
offer distinction
131 might only be one element in a complete unconstitutional conditions analysis.

Although Simons's article provides an interesting intellectual inquiry
and some advice to the Court on what level of scrutiny should apply to
various rights, it still lacks a plausible method of classifying and predicting unconstitutional conditions cases.
Other commentators have suggested abandoning the doctrine altogether, and still others have recommended new positive theories that
the Court could use by separating the cases into subgroups based on the
subject matter involved.13 2 While pages could be written pointing out
the shortcomings of prior efforts to unravel this most twisted legal
125. Kenneth W. Simons, Offers, Threats, and UnconstitutionalConditions, 26 San Diego
L. Rev. 289 (1989).
126. Id. at 290.
127. Id. at 292.
128. Id. at 291.
129. Id. at 325.
130. See Part ll.B.
131. Simons, 26 San Diego L. Rev. at 325 (cited in note 125).
132. For a proposal to drop the doctrine altogether, see Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 593 (1990). For a new positive
theory, see Baker, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1185 (cited in note 111).
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problem, the point is that no rule currently exists that practitioners can
apply to analyze future cases.
D.

So Where Does the Instant Case Fall?: A PracticalApproach

Although many commentators provide several insightful solutions
or alternative methods of deciding unconstitutional conditions cases, a
recommendation, unless the Court up and explicitly adopts it, offers little guidance in a particular case. The reason that no commentator has
found a workable solution is not lack of competence or diligence, but
rather that no solution exists to explain the erratic myriad of unconstitutional conditions cases. Even if a commentator found a rule that coincidentally explained why all of the cases are decided as they are, this
rule would do nothing to advance the ultimate goal of predicting the
outcome of a new case. This proposition is true because any rule that
the Court did not actually employ would have little correlation to future outcomes, mainly because such a rule would be nothing more than
a coincidence.
To demonstrate this proposition, if a commentator noticed that all
winning parties so far had worn red ties, that would not necessarily
mean that all future wearers of red ties would win unless the Court
actually used a red-tie rule. Also, if the Court did rely on some rule, it
follows that the court would share this rule with practitioners in the
dicta of its cases. That no rule exists is a necessary conclusion from the
nearly complete randomness of the outcomes. While commentators
have delved into the annals of philosophy in search of an answer, it
seems highly improbable that our Supreme Court Justices spend their
free time poring over Kantian or Millsian philosophy in search of hidden undercurrents to weave inconspicuously into unconstitutional conditions cases.
Therefore, the search for how the Court would treat a Norplant
statute has, so far, uncovered three options. One could take the Court's
discretionary buzzwords at face value and undertake the inherently impossible task of predicting whether this law would be a "penalty," a
"nonsubsidy," an "undue burden," or an "aim at the suppression of
dangerous ideas." Or, one could turn to the secondary sources consisting of articles and treatises and then either give up or hope that the
Court expressly adopts one of the suggested alternatives. Or finally, one
could try to determine what factors really determine a holding. In other
words, one could try to figure out what leads the Court to hand down
opposite holdings on similar facts in the area of unconstitutional
conditions.
In fact, a more practical inquiry into exactly how the Court does
reach a particular decision may be the best method, if any such method
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exists, of predicting future outcomes. It appears from the inconsistency
of opinions that the Court must treat each case as a separate fact pattern and side with the party with whom it sympathizes most. That is to
suggest that the Court reaches its decision based purely or primarily on
the particular facts and retrospectively tailors its opinion to comport
with this first conclusion. Assuming for the moment that this hypothesis may be the best explanation absent any alternative, one would then
want to know which factors the Court favors in a case and which factors
the Court finds disfavorable.
In an effort to support this hypothesis, twenty-nine unconstitutional conditions cases were dissected 133 and seven pragmatic factors
were examined to see if there were any patterns or similarities in cases
that were won and lost. The factors considered were 1) germaneness or
relatedness of the condition to the purpose of the law itself;1 3 2) coercion or how restrictive the condition was; 3) the type of benefit involved
(e.g., was it a government monopoly or were there other markets for the
benefit); 4) status of the plaintiff or challenger (e.g., state, person, male,
female, AFDC recipient); 5) what fundamental right was implicated; 6)
whether the law in question was state or federal; and 7) what year the
Court's opinion was written and who wrote it.
The first two categories, germaneness and coercion, eventually
sifted out of the analysis because they were inherently too relative. In
other words, there is no way to quantify with any certainty whether a
condition is related to the law or whether a condition is coercive. For
example, withholding a unique privilege such as the right to use highways is definitely coercive because this privilege cannot be obtained
anywhere else. However, welfare benefits can cut both ways. No one
else is giving away sustenance income, but people can arguably choose
133. These cases included: Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583
(1926); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978);
Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693 (1986); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Lyng v. InternationalUnion, 485 U.S. 360
(1988); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc's v. Tourism Co., 112 S.
Ct. 2791 (1992); Regan v. Taxation With Representation,461 U.S. 540 (1983); Rust v. Sullivan,
111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Thomas v. Review Bd.of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981);
Turner v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
134. This same characteristic was analyzed in Sullivan, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (cited in note
112).
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to work and not depend on the government support. Similarly, the type
of government benefit did not offer much assistance because it was tied
to how coercive a particular benefit was. Furthermore, nearly all government benefits are arguably monopolistic since there are very few
competitors for free services so this category dropped out as well.
The fourth category, the status of the plaintiff, was more easily
quantifiable and did offer some insight. In general, indigent plaintiffs
lost sixty-nine percent of the cases they brought. Of the indigent losers,
forty-four percent were mothers seeking federal funding for abortion. In
fact, indigent mothers asserting abortion rights never won. Similarly,
government-funded health care workers wanting to provide abortions
lost both times they brought suit.'3 5 Interestingly, Native Americans
lost both cases where they asserted religious rights, and union members
were also zero for two."3 6 Of the prevailing plaintiffs, Seventh Day Adventists always won as did deadbeat fathers. 3 7 Working pregnant
women who planned to carry to term went two for three.3 8 These statistics possibly suggest that indigent pregnant women seeking abortion
protection, Native Americans, and union members are not classes that
the Court actively seeks to protect.
A related category is what right was conditioned in cases where the
law was either upheld or overturned. Cases involving conditions that
affect the right to abortion were always upheld. 3 9 Laws affecting free
speech in the context of commercial speech and lobbying generally were
sustained. 140 Also, laws affecting First Amendment assembly rights were
usually upheld.' 4' Contrary to the specific categories of free speech
cases, general First Amendment free speech conditions usually were
overturned and free exercise challenges won, provided the religion was
not Native American."4 Regarding miscellaneous fundamental rights
such as the right to freedom from unreasonable searches, there were not
enough examples to indicate patterns. From this data, one conclusion
emerges: abortion rights and certain forms of free speech are not likely
to receive unconstitutional condition protection from the Court.
135. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040, and Rust, 111 S. Ct. 1759.
136. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (both involving Native American plaintiffs).
137. See Sherbert, 314 U.S. 398; Hobie, 480 U.S. 136; and Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374.
138. See LaFleur,414 U.S. 632; Turner, 423 U.S. 44; and Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484.
139. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040; Rust, 111 S. Ct. 1759; Maher, 432 U.S. 464; Poelker, 432
U.S. 519; Beal, 432 U.S. 438; Harris,448 U.S. 297.
140. See Posadas, 112 S. Ct. 2791; Regan, 461 U.S. 540.
141. See Douds, 339 U.S. 382; Lying, 485 U.S. 360. But see Moreno, 413 U.S. 528.
142. See Speiser, 357 U.S. 513; League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364. See also notes 136-
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Whether the law was a state law or federal law seemed to have a
great empirical impact. In fact, twelve of the thirteen, or ninety-two
percent, of the laws struck down were state laws. 143 Of the sixteen laws
upheld, the cases were divided about evenly between state and federal
laws. If most of the abortion laws had not been state laws, this ratio
would not be so close-that is, the disparity between federal laws and
state laws that were upheld would not have been so great. Of the eight
state laws upheld, six involved state laws concerning abortion. The
ninety-two percent state law failure rate could indicate that the Court
is more willing to overturn a state law than a federal law. Alternatively,
it could mean that states are more likely to pass unconstitutional laws
or that the Court thinks that state laws are unconstitutional more often
than federal laws.14 4 The fact that several interpretations are possible
emphasizes that one should be very careful about drawing conclusions
from this data. The point is that the Court overrules state laws more
often than it overrules federal laws.
The last category combines the year of the decision with the author
and supporters of the opinion because these elements are inherently dependent. These determinations are important because they illustrate a
chronological trend to these decisions over time. Because the Court's
members change over time, so does its enthusiasm for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. A chronological trend away from unconstitutional conditions currently exists. The peak date of successful
unconstitutional conditions challenges (that is, cases where the law was
overturned) is 1971.141 On the other hand, the peak date of cases where
the law in question was upheld is 1979.146 Stated another way, of the
significant unconstitutional condition cases since 1985, six plaintiffs lost
and only two prevailed. Hence, the trend is not to apply the doctrine.
This trend indicates a tipping of the doctrinal balance from active
review of legislation to a more deferential approach, from liberal to conservative, and from penalty analysis to non-subsidy. To clarify, the arguably more conservative justices, led by Justice Rehnquist, despise the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and nearly always espouse a version of the Holmesian greater-includes-the-lesser philosophy. To the
contrary, the historically more activist or liberal justices, led primarily
143.
144.

Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, was the only case to strike down a federal law.
Also, the Court could be weary of separation of powers concerns regarding the other two

branches.
145. The peak represents the total of the years of each successful challenge divided by the
number of such cases. In other words, 1971 represents the peak of the unconstitutional conditions
cases.
146. This peak was computed the same way. These two peak dates suggest that the more
recent the case, the more likely that the law will be upheld.
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by Justice Brennan, struggled to maintain the doctrine. In fact, ten of
eleven, or ninety-one percent, of the law-reversing opinions issued while
Justice Brennan was on the Court were either written or supported by
Justice Brennan. 14 7 Furthermore, Justice Brennan dissented in twelve
of the fourteen cases where the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
was not invoked. In contrast, Justice Rehnquist, since his appointment,
has dissented in eight of the nine cases where the Court employed the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to overturn a law. Furthermore,
Justice Rehnquist wrote or supported all of the fourteen cases where
unconstitutional conditions challenges lost.
This doctrinal conflict within the Court probably contributes most
to the inconsistency of unconstitutional conditions opinions. Whether
the case succeeds or fails must be decided by the moderate Justices,
whose votes determine the closer cases. For this reason, the fact scenario of the case before the Court carries more weight than perhaps it
should in a pure constitutional analysis. This reasoning is intuitive. If
this were not true and if all of the Justices had firm doctrines but varying viewpoints, the decisions involving similar rights and similar conditions all would be consistent. One might argue that each Justice
between the poles may have a firm but different version or criteria for
implicating the doctrine. But this still would not explain why similar,
but not identical, cases produce different results.
This analysis provides the most realistic, pragmatic supposition of
what occurs when the Court is faced with a classic conditioned benefit
situation. Justice Rehnquist makes the Holmesian argument, Justice
Brennan or one from his camp makes the unconstitutional conditions
argument, and the other justices side with the party in the case that
they think should prevail for whatever reason.1 48 Absent any firm conceptual convictions, this decision of which side to take will be purely
discretionary. Once the Court votes and finds for one side or the other,
they must then creatively and carefully slip this new decision into the
bottom of a delicately balanced stack of previous decisions. Inserting
new inconsistent decisions within this teetering stack engenders the
vague discretionary terms and unconvincing distinctions that spark
criticism and confusion among constitutional scholars.
147. Incidentally, Justices Marshall and Blackmun almost always vote with Brennan in each
of these cases.
148. It will be interesting to see the effect of Justices Brennan's and Marshall's absence from
the Court on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The only notable case since Justice Brennan's absence is Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). In that case, Justices Blackmun, Marshall, O'Connor, and Stevens dissented. Since Justice Marshall has been replaced by Justice
Thomas, there may be few Justices left who will defend the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
However, Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Souter have yet to establish a trend one way or another,
although it is unlikely that any of these Justices will become a strong advocate of the doctrine.
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How Well Does This PragmaticApproach Explain the Close
Cases?

Applying this pragmatic theory to the aforementioned cases offers
some logical explanation of how these cases were decided. In Perry v.
Sinderman, the Court was faced with a school teacher whom the state
university had fired, or at least not rehired, for speaking out against the
school administration. 14 In Perry, it would be easy for a Supreme
Court Justice to sympathize with a scholarly man who was mistreated
by the system, especially when that system is state and not federal.
This set of facts led to the broad ruling that states cannot condition
benefits on forbearance of fundamental rights.
Then in Douds, the Court was faced with union organizers whom
Congress suspected were communist sympathizers. Thus, the Court,
during the McCarthy era, upheld a federal condition that these leaders
pledge an oath of loyalty to receive federal union benefits. The Court in
Douds simply could not find any "suppression of dangerous ideas." One
year later, however, veterans were charged with nearly the same condition in order to receive state tax exemptions in Speiser.'5 0 This case
pitted a poor veteran, defender of his country, against the State of California. The Court found enough "suppression of dangerous ideas" to
protect the veteran from the encroaching state.
Years later, the lobbyists of Taxation With Representation came
to court in search of judicial protection for their right to lobby against
the IRS. Not surprisingly, the Court, as members of the District of Columbia establishment, did not sympathize with the lobbyists standing
before them. Therefore the Court determined that no dangerous ideas
were suppressed and that the Congress had no duty to subsidize lobbying activity.
In FCC v. League of Women Voters, the next unconstitutional conditions case before the Court, the small public radio stations in California, beacons of progressive ideas, were being pressured by a state bribe
prohibiting any editorializing. 15 The Court found an unconstitutional
condition. A common theme emerges. Likable plaintiffs challenging
state laws tend to fare better than less favorable plaintiffs challenging
federal laws.
Subsequently, cases like Sherbert appeared where poor unemployed women were forced by the state to choose between their Sab149.

408 U.S. 593 (1972).

150. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
151. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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bath or unemployment insurance.1 52 In these sympathetic cases, the
Court found a penalty on the exercise of religion even though the state
did not intend to create one. The Court required South Carolina to
carve out an exception for Saturday Sabbath observers like the plaintiff. Trhe Court, however, perhaps understandably but not excusably,
did not have the same sympathy for the Roys, whose Native American
beliefs were jeopardized by the Social Security system. The only important differences between Sherbert and Roy are the religious sect in
question and the creator of the law. It is easy to see that the Court
could sympathize more easily with a Saturday Sabbath interference
than with a fear of spiritual contamination induced by Social Security
numbers. This distinction, however, should be irrelevant when undertaking a constitutional analysis. There is nothing to suggest that the
Roys' religious conviction was any less important or less genuine than
Sherbert's. Therefore, the Roys should be given the same consideration
and constitutional protection as Seventh Day Adventists, but they apparently do not have the same right.
Similar considerations drive the two marriage cases, Jobst and
Zablocki. On one hand, a federal Social Security law terminates benefits
to certain classes who decide to marry. 153 On the other hand, a state law
requires fathers to square their debts before getting married.15 4 Although the financial restraints could be the same in a particular case
under either statute, the first law is constitutional and the second is
not. Interestingly, the Jobst Court pointed out that due to the existence
of another unrelated aid program, the plaintiff and his new wife would
have lost only a net amount of $20 per month. 155 This coincidental fact
certainly would make it easier to justify the decision on the facts and
ignore the fact that the same principle should be driving all such
56
cases.
The same trends apply to the female privacy rights cases. When
school teachers challenge state laws that condition continuous employment on foregoing the right to bear children, the Court finds such laws
152. Actually, if she had submitted to Sabbath Day work, she would have had a job and not
unemployment insurance. The whole reason she was seeking unemployment was because she
turned down a job that required Saturday work.
153. See Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
154. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
155. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 57 n.17.
156. The reason that quantitative judgements are undesirable is quite simple. If the Court
decided these cases based on how much money was involved, this determination would only add
another discretionary variable as to how much money is enough to constitute an interference. This
obviously depends on who is affected, and it ignores the principle that Congress supposedly cannot
put indirect pressure on rights that it could not attack directly. For example, the Court was not
willing to make such judgments in Harperv. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), where
the amount was only $1.50 but the condition involved voting.
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unconstitutional. 15 7 However, when indigent pregnant women seeking
abortion challenge federal and state laws that eliminate this fundamental option, 158 the Court swings the other way, even though the interference, being potentially prohibitive, is arguably greater for the indigents.
This result confirms the observation that the Court generally sides with
working pregnant women who carry to term and generally sides against
indigent women seeking abortion. The fact that Rust v. Sullivan
presented a classic unconstitutional conditions situation and the Court
refused to find any "undue burdens," "penalties," or "suppression of
dangerous ideas," supports the conclusion that the Court disfavors
abortion rights and refuses to protect those rights in the same way that
it protects other fundamental rights. 159 Ample evidence exists that one
must look to particular incidental facts of a particular case with these
trends in mind to make any sort of prediction as to how the Court
would treat that case.
With regard to a Norplant statute, it is significant that the law
would be a state one, which the Court seems more predisposed to overturn. However, the plaintiff would be indigent, and the Court seems less
sympathetic with indigent plaintiffs than with nonindigent plaintiffs.
Intuitively, it may be difficult for elderly, upper class Justices to sympathize with the plight facing poor, young, unmarried, pregnant women.
In fact, the Court may adopt the "moral" view that efforts should be
made to curb reproduction in the "lower" classes. More often than not,
the Court does not overturn conditional laws where the benefit is welfare. Perhaps the most controlling fact in a Norplant case would be how
the Court views the right.160 If the Court considers this law to be an
infringement on the right to contraception, it may see the right in the
same vein as abortion-a kiss of death for the challenger. If, however,
the Court broadens the right in question to procreation, an arguably
more favored right, the Court very well may overturn the law.' Therefore, the right involved could determine the outcome.
Because the Court does not find an interference when it does not
like the facts, and the Court's view of the facts seems at least partially
dependent on the right involved, it is nearly impossible to tell whether
the Court would apply the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. If,
however, the Court did not apply the doctrine to a Norplant case, in
what is arguably a perfect unconstitutional conditions context, the Nor157. See, for example, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
158. See, for example, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
159. There is no need to speculate as to why the Court might disfavor abortion, but the
answer could lie in who appointed a particular Justice and for what reason.
160. This point is expanded in Part III.
161. Judging from the case breakdown, any right is more favored than the abortion right.
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plant statute could spell the end of unconstitutional conditions analysis. Regardless of the outcome, the Court would be hard pressed to
insert a Norplant case in the bottom of the towering stack of inconsistent cases.

IV.

THE RIGHT, ITS FUNDAMENTAL NATURE, AND THE LEVEL OF
SCRUTINY

If the Court failed to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to a Norplant case, then no interference with any right would exist
and a challenge to the law would fail at that point. This section, therefore, presumes that the Court is willing to apply the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and has found an interference with a right. This
conditioned interference, once found by the Court, presumably will be
equivalent to a direct interference. In other words, one could assume
that the law required women to implant Norplant for purposes of analyzing the right involved. The next step is to determine what right is
implicated, whether it is fundamental, and what level of scrutiny is
applicable.
A.

Background

While the Constitution and the Bill of Rights only specifically list a
handful of fundamental rights, the Court, since the Lochner era, has
read other rights into the Constitution and its amendments. 6 2 The
Court has categorized these fundamental rights as arising from
"penumbras, formed by emanations" of the Bill of Rights that are inherent to individual liberty.16 3 In Roe v. Wade, the most famous of
these cases, the Court expanded the scope of fundamental privacy
rights to those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' 164 The problem with this relatively new bundle of privacy rights is predicting which
rights are included, what constitutes an interference, and what level of
scrutiny applies.
Obviously, the phrase "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
reveals nothing as to which rights are included in the bundle. It does,
however, suggest that more rights are included than just abortion.
While many cases include similar loose dicta, the fact that the Court
has refused to recognize certain rights that arguably should be included
162.
163.
164.
(1937)).

See Gerald Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw 491 (Foundation, 12th ed. 1991).
See, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
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in this bundle indicates that one should never assume a right is fundamental until a case specifically holds so on its facts.' 65
As noted earlier, the right implicated by the Norplant statute can
be categorized in different ways, each of which could impact on the outcome of the case. One argument would claim that a Norplant statute
would interfere with a woman's right to use birth control, which is
within the scope of privacy rights. For support, the plaintiff could rely
on Griswold v. Connecticut.'6 In Griswold, the Court struck down a
Connecticut law that forbade married people from using contraceptives.
A viable argument would propose that, from a reverse standpoint, the
Norplant law impinges on the same right as Griswold. In other words,
the right to use birth control includes the right to refuse birth control.
Nonetheless, substantial counterarguments exist. First, the state could
argue that the facts are distinguishable. Griswold emphasized that the
right to use birth control is enshrouded in the marriage relationship, an
association older than the Bill of Rights and "as noble a purpose as any
involved in [the Court's] prior decisions.'

67

This language suggests that

the plaintiffs' marriage status in Griswold added to the fundamental
aspects of the right that was infringed. The state could argue that this
proposed Norplant law does not involve any interference upon the marriage relationship but only involves single women receiving AFDC.
Hence, the plaintiffs' side might be better served if a married welfare
recipient brings the initial challenge to the law.
Another case may shed some insight on this point. In Eisenstadt v.
Baird,6 5 the Court invalidated a law banning the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people. While Baird has been touted as expansion of the right to contraception to unmarried persons, the Baird
Court purportedly only applied a rational basis equal protection analysis and avoided the classification of the right as fundamental. 69 Another subsequent case, Carey v. Population Services, 70 involved
restrictions on contraception advertising and distribution. In Carey, the
Court declared the right to contraception fundamental and applied the
compelling interest test. It declared that "[t]he decision whether or not
to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of [the] cluster of constitu165. See, for example, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting the argument that
the right to consensual sodomy, at least in the homosexual context, is fundamental); Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (holding that the right of policemen to choose their hair style is not
fundamental); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding that there is no fundamental right to

restricted government access to medical information).
166.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

167. Id. at 486.
168.
169.
170.

405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw at 504 (cited in note 162).
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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tionally protected choices.'' 1 1 While this strong statement provides convincing ammunition for the argument that the right to choose
contraception generally is a fundamental right, the state still could contend that this dicta is not necessarily dispositive of a Norplant case. In
scheme, the
fact, the state could argue that, as a welfare distribution
17 2
state deserves wide latitude in its distribution decisions.
Preferably, the Norplant plaintiff would assert that the underlying
right interfered with is the right to procreate, not merely the right to
choose contraception. In other words, the real motive of the law is not
to ban or to require birth control but to curb the reproduction of the
welfare class. For support, the plaintiffs could rely on Skinner v.
Oklahoma 3 as holding that the right to procreate is fundamental. The
plaintiffs could further point out that the Court made the same asfor the proposition that the
sumption in Roe, where it cited Skinner
74
right to procreate is fundamental.1
The state could again refer to factual differences. Skinner involved
a criminal prosecution where sterilization was a punishment imposed
against Skinner's will. Also, the Court treated Skinner as an equal protection case and not as a substantive due process case. As an equal protection case, more rights arguably are included as fundamental because
classifications generally are more suspect than across the board substantive interferences.17 5 In response, the plaintiffs could cite Meyer v.
7
1 where the Court in 1923 held that the right "to marry,
Nebraska,1
establish a home and bring up children" is a central part of the liberty
protected by due process. 7 Finally, the "bear or beget" language of
171. Id. at 685.
172. The Court has made statements to that effect. See, for example, Dandridgev. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970) (stating that "[t]here is no question that States have considerable latitude
in allocating their AFDC resources"). The Court added that the "intractable economic, social, and
even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business
of this Court." 397 U.S. at 487.
173. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that sterilizing certain classes of repeat offenders but not
others violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteeth Amendment and deserves strict scrutiny because the classification involves the "fundamental" right to procreate).
174. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
175. The Skinner Court applied strict scrutiny because the Court generally is more suspicious of legislative actions that single out groups. In other words, the Court is more likely to apply
strict scrutiny when a fundamental right is affected by a classification scheme than when it is an
across the board interference.
176. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
177. Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added). This case is especially significant because it predates
Roe by fifty years and lends support for the proposition that certain nonlisted rights are
fundamental.
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Carey17 a also lends strong support for the proposition that procreation
is a fundamental right.
The point is that although the Court has included broad statements in dicta, it never has ruled on the exact facts presented by a
Norplant case. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the Court would
agree that the right to be free from a conditional Norplant statute's
provisions is fundamental.
The distinction between the right to birth control and the right to
procreation is indeed a subtle one and one that the Court perhaps does
not recognize, 179 but it could prove relevant when one determines the
level of scrutiny such a right deserves. The baseline presumption is that
any right deemed fundamental by the Court receives the same strict
scrutiny test that the Court traditionally has applied to cases involving
specifically listed rights. This presumption holds true at least for the
early privacy cases such as Roe and Griswold. s0 If the Court did not
find the right to be fundamental, then a lesser scrutiny applied.'as If
this presumption always held true, no need to distinguish between procreation and contraception would exist. However, there is some hint
that the Court holds some "fundamental" rights in a more favorable
light than others.'8 2 This observation applies not only to privacy rights
compared to specifically listed rights but also to certain rights within
the sphere of privacy rights.
One of the first examples of this hierarchy of rights was Shapiro v.
Thompson.' 83 In Shapiro, the Court identified a fundamental right to
interstate travel, but instead of treating the right as absolute, the Court
held that states could not "unreasonably burden" this right.8 4 In other
words, a certain amount of burden is constitutional until this burden
reaches what the Court in its discretion deems an "unreasonable" level.
The Court attached similar, familiar, discretionary rhetoric to the Roe
abortion right in Maher v. Roe. 85 In Maher, the Court reasoned that
178. 431 U.S. at 685. Carey, which overturned a restriction on contraception distribution,
held that the right to "bear or beget" a child is fundamental. This implies that the right to contraception includes both the right to use it and not to use it. Furthermore, Carey seems to view the
right to procreate and the right to use birth control as involving the same fundamental right.
179. Testament to this assertion is the way the Court uses procreation language ("beget or
bear a child") in Carey, a contraception case. Id.
180. Both of these cases applied a compelling interest test to determine if the law passed
constitutional muster.
181. See, for example, Baird, 405 U.S. at 447; Maher, 432 U.S. at 470.
182. See notes 158-62.
183. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
184. Id. at 629. Interestingly, Justice Harlan criticized this approach in his dissent. He disapproved of the arbitrary, ad hoc method of picking out certain activity and calling it fundamental.
Id. at 662 (Harlan dissenting).

185. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).

748

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:715

Roe "protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with
her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy."' 18 The
Court has used this malleable phrase to allow inroads into the supposedly "fundamental" right to abortion. 187 Although Thompson proves

that the Court is willing to use this phrase in relation to privacy rights
other than abortion,'88 the Court seems to employ it most often when
the right subject to a challenge is abortion. 8 9 This fact is reinforced by
the similar findings in the case by case breakdown in the unconstitutional conditions analysis. 1 0
If privacy rights are indeed less protected than specifically listed
rights, and abortion is the least protected of the privacy rights, it would
behoove the plaintiff to distance her case as far from the abortion cases
as possible. Because Griswold often is cited along with Roe and birth
control cases, it could carry some of the same moral stigma as abortion.
Perhaps the plaintiff would be better served by contending that the
proposed law interferes with the arguably more wholesome right of procreation. On the other hand, the state could argue by analogy that the
right to choose birth control can be regulated up to the point of an
"undue burden" and that the Norplant statute, as a welfare program,
creates no obstacle to contraception that was not already there.' In
fact, the state will argue that the law benefits welfare women because it
gives them a new option for birth control that was not previously readily attainable.
This latter argument reflects another concession that the Court has
made in recent cases. In more than one instance, the Court has suggested in dicta that the constitutional standard of review for conditions
is necessarily more lenient than if the government had directly or prohibitively interfered with the same right. 19 2 This assertion flies in the
186. Id. at 473-74.
187. See Part II and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
188. Some evidence of this same analysis exists in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). In Roy,
the Court found the burden relative to the applicable scrutiny and determined that the burden
was not equivalent to a burden of "compulsion or prohibition." Thus, only a rational basis test was
required.
189. See, for example, Webster v. Reproductive Health Service, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132, 147 (1976).
190. See Part III.D.
191. For an example of an instance in which the Court accepted this argument, see Maher,
432 U.S. at 473.
192. See, for example, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706-07 (1986) (holding that "[a] governmental burden on religious liberty is not insulated from review simply because it is indirect, but
the nature of the burden is relevant to the standard the government must meet to justify the
burden") (citations omitted). See also Maher, 432 U.S. at 475, in which the Court stated that
"[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy."
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face of the traditional unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which supposes that a conditioned burden is equivalent to a direct interference. If
a lesser scrutiny does apply when the interference is neither direct nor
prohibitive, nor "unduly burdensome," then the standard must be a rational basis test. This conclusion follows from the observation that the
Court has applied only two standards to privacy rights to date, the
compelling interest test and the rational basis test.193
This last erosive rule intertwines the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine with the elusive privacy right. This rule implies that conditional or lopsided funding deserves a lesser scrutiny (the rational basis
test) because such a less-than-prohibitive interference presumably does
not reach the level of "unduly burdensome." From this principle, it follows that the state could successfully defend a Norplant law since such
a law would be less "burdensome" than the abortion cases, which already have gained approval. In essence, if a law that effectively denies
indigent women the right to receive an abortion is not unduly burdensome, then a law that only adds an option to the contraception menu
and does nothing to prohibit either side of the contraception choice
must be constitutional as well. In simpler terms, since a Norplant law
would not encroach nearly as much as the recent abortion restrictive
laws, it probably would fall on the deferential side of the Court's malleable rhetoric.
B.

The Compelling Interest and Rational Basis Tests
Although the Court most likely would not apply a compelling interest test, it may choose not to expand the reasoning of abortion cases to
procreation cases. If it does not do so, then the Court may apply a compelling interest test to the Norplant law. The compelling interest test
requires 1) that the law further a compelling governmental interest and
2) that less intrusive alternatives to the law do not exist.""
If a compelling interest test is applied, the government will argue
that it has a compelling interest in reducing welfare costs and that the
Norplant law would further this objective. Alternatively, the state could
argue that it has a compelling interest in preventing unborn children
from being born into the oppression of poverty. This non-economic argument may fare better than a purely economic one. 195 The Court has
held that the government does not have a compelling interest in an em193. One exception to this observation is Zablocki v. Redhail, in which the Court called an
apparent compelling interest test a "critical examination." 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (quoting Mass.
Board of Retirement v. Muyra, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976)).
194. See, for example, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1972).
195. It may fare better because it pits two human rights interests against each other rather
than an economic interest against a human rights interest although it is paternalistic.
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bryo until the third trimester.1 9 On the other hand, some states are
trying to require women who bear crack babies to submit to Norplant
in order to protect the interests of future unborns 9 7 If these or other
preventive measures pass scrutiny, the government could import the
same logic to the instant case.
Even if the government can pass the first prong, the challenger still
could argue successfully that less intrusive alternatives are available.
For example, the states could follow California and North Carolina and
merely provide Norplant for those who want it but not attach a coercive
benefit to it. In light of the fact that welfare mothers are not the
criminals that crack mothers arguably are, this alternative seems much
more palatable than the payment schemes.
If the government successfully argues that the recent line of abortion cases should apply to this case, the Court most likely will apply a
rational basis test. This test requires 1) that the government have a
rational reason for the law and 2) that the law reasonably furthers this
objective. The rational basis test has become increasingly deferential in
recent years. Laws rarely, if ever, fail this test. The rational basis test
guards primarily against arbitrary or capricious governmental acts that
escape the compelling interest test.19 8 The government could easily
meet rational basis scrutiny by asserting that the Norplant law reasonably furthers the rational objective of reforming welfare and cutting
costs. Therefore, the level of scrutiny applied will be outcome determinative of a Norplant case.
V.

SOLUTIONS

Many possible solutions have been suggested. One commendable
approach suggested by Kathleen Sullivan would subject any law to
strict scrutiny that "pressures" a fundamental right. 9 9 Although determining what pressures a right arguably would be no different from separating penalties from non-subsidies, Sullivan also proposes that when
in doubt the Court should apply the stricter scrutiny. This approach
would be an improvement over the current one, but it touches on another, perhaps overlooked, point-that more cases should face the compelling interest test. The Court, however, with its front line of
discretionary phrases, has subverted the normal course of analysis. In
196.
197.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
For example, Governor Pete Wilson wants to require mothers of crack babies to use

Norplant in California. Norplant Plan Irks Right, Arizona Republic at A17 (May 24, 1991).
198. See, for example, Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown
of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L. J. 161 (1984) (arguing that since the New Deal, the
rational basis test has become increasingly difficult for challengers to overcome).
199. See Sullivan, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 1499-1505 (cited in note 112).
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other words, the Court, by finding that a right is not "unduly burdensome" or "penalized" in the first instance, avoids the traditional incremental constitutional inquiry that each challenged law deserves.
Perhaps if the Court returned to a traditional approach, this discretion
could become obsolete and unnecessary.
More specifically, the Court could approach each case with the assumption that all fundamental rights are equally fundamental and absolute. No need for second guessing the degree of "fundamentalness" or
creating a hierarchy of rights would exist. Nor would an initial decision
of whether the interference involved was burdensome enough to warrant further analysis be necessary. Under such a method, any interference with any fundamental right would trigger the constitutional strict
scrutiny test. This is not to suggest that the Court cannot inject discretion into constitutional cases. The point is that discretion should be
exclusively limited to the balancing stage within the compelling interest
test. This approach would capsule discretionary judgments and apply a
predetermined inquiry, namely whether the government interest is
compelling and whether the Norplant law is the least intrusive approach. With a predetermined set of questions, the Court might be less
likely to resort to subjective factors not germane to the outcome. If the
Court felt a law was justified, then it could explain how it passes the
compelling interest test.
The problem with this system, and perhaps the reason that the
Court has not used it, is that many of the laws that the Court has upheld would not fare well against such a rigid analytical framework. For
example, if the Court applied a fundamental constitutional analysis to
the facts of Rust v. Sullivan, the abortion gag rule case, it would ask
whether an interference with the right to abortion existed. Since fewer
indigent women would have access to information regarding abortion,
the assumption follows that the law would, at least indirectly, interfere
with this protected choice. Granted, this interference is not as great as
an absolute ban to abortion, but making such judgments outcome determinative infects the analysis with discretion where it does not belong. Any interference should promote the analysis to the next
question: whether the right is fundamental. According to Roe, the right
to abortion is fundamental; therefore, the compelling interest test
applies.
Only here, in the context of balancing the governmental interest
with the intrusion, does the level of interference become relevant. Although the regulation at issue in Sullivan was only marginally intrusive
on the right to abortion, no palatable governmental interest to justify
even this indirect interference can be found. In Sullivan, the government, and the Court for that matter, would have a difficult time finding

752

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:715

a compelling governmental interest in preventing indigent women from
accessing abortion information. The only viable justification is that either the government simply does not approve of abortion or it does not
feel that providing information regarding abortion is in the public's best
interest-and this is the type of decisionmaking that judicial review
should police. Given the difficulty that the "gag rule" would encounter
in facing the compelling interest test, the Court had little choice but to
dispose of Sullivan through its discretionary rhetoric rather than to apply a traditional constitutional analysis. However, it is this drifting
from the course that leads to inconsistent and unpredictable decisions.
Returning to a rigid format might produce some unpopular decisions,
but it would promote consistency and eventually provide a more workable framework for future cases.
While a new approach may be warranted, the Court most likely will
apply the current approach in the Norplant situation. One main consequence of the Court's muddled analysis is that it makes any attempt at
using stare decisis to predict future outcomes nearly impossible. 00 One
must pore through all of the considerations, trends, and hierarchy of
rights in the aggregate to make any prophetic judgments about the fate
of a Norplant case. After an analysis of the arguments advanced in the
privacy, or more specifically the abortion cases, it appears that the state
would have stronger arguments on why this law is less "burdensome"
than some of the abortion legislation already upheld. A challenger must
emphasize the distinction between the more "limited" right to abortion
and the more absolute right of procreation. Then the plaintiff must
hope that the Court is sympathetic enough to weave another turn into
the ever-changing tide of unconstitutional conditions cases. Stated another way, the current trend brought about by the abortion funding
cases is toward deference to the government in its choice of funding
schemes. Striking down the Norplant law would require a change in the
current trend and another inconsistent case for academics to criticize.
Also, by refusing to extend the reasoning of the abortion cases to procreation cases, the Court would be professing that abortion cases are
disfavored. On the other hand, if the Court upholds this classic
purchase of a right, it could mark the end of the unconstitutional conditions cases and clear the path for future government purchase of rights.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The unconstitutional conditions cases themselves reflect a doctrinal
split within the Court that leads to inconsistent decisions ultimately
200. Any hint of cynicism in this note is not aimed at the results or specific outcomes of
cases but at the haphazard and inconsistent approach the Court has used.
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decided by the policy and sympathy views of the moderate Justices.
Justice Rehnquist leads the charge against the doctrine while the Justice Brennan camp struggles to uphold it. Consequently, academic and
philosophical attempts to explain the cases have proven futile. To predict what factors appear to influence the Court, one must resort to
quantitative statistical trends to "guesstimate" on which side a new
case will fall. Such a breakdown suggests a recent trend away from the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine but not a complete retreat, since
some cases have upheld the doctrine as recently as 1987. Noteworthy
determinants include whether the law is state or federal, since federal
laws rarely are overturned. Also, the plight and status of the plaintiff
seems to play a part in the analysis. Finally, the subject or right involved seems equally determinative, abortion being the right least likely
to be found unconstitutionally burdened with a condition.
By allowing the right involved to influence the determination of
whether a condition on that right is unconstitutional, the Court has
blurred the boundaries of the more rigid incremental structure that a
constitutional inquiry ideally should follow. As evidenced by the ideal
argument against the Norplant law, an incremental approach separates
and clarifies the arguments and issues within each step of a traditional
constitutional argument and prevents one result from influencing the
other. In practice, however, the Court apparently has softened these
distinctions making one result, whether there is an interference, dependent on the answer as to which right is implicated. The Court made this
approach possible by leaving its trail of discretionary rhetoric in order
to reserve substantial discretionary power in deciding both unconstitutional conditions cases and privacy rights cases. In other words, the
Court is able to take an unconstitutional conditions situation, look at
the right involved, and determine at the outset that this right is in no
way "unduly burdened." The Court thereby avoids the formalities of a
true constitutional inquiry. The statute never has to meet the compelling interest test, and the Court never has to declare the right
fundamental.
While it seems that a Norplant statute stands a better chance of
withstanding a constitutional challenge, this outcome is hardly guaranteed. A state considering the legislation may be better served by adopting the voluntary approaches already operating in North Carolina and
California. Even if no state passes a law similar to the one here addressed, the inquiry is still worthwhile. Given the geometric population
expansion, the state and the federal governments will find themselves
increasingly faced with difficult choices between personal autonomy and
the overall social welfare. As resources become more scarce, governments will have to come to terms with how to best balance distribution
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